

Drake University

Implementing Microgrids:

Or how I learned to stop worrying and love
utility regulation

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The Grid is the Context

- Historically the **Grid** is a transportation system to get electricity from **generation** to **load** (consumers)
 - **Transmission** – superhighways
 - **Distribution** – roads, streets and alleys
 - **Safety Systems** – traffic management devices
- Now it is rapidly evolving
- The grid still provides the engineering, business and legal context for microgrids
- Energy regulation was developed to protect the consumer (and utilities), not to empower the end user

The Grid is a Control Area

- An electric power system with **common automatic controls** that:
 - **Balances** power from generation and imports with load
 - Maintains scheduled **interchange** with other control areas
 - Maintains the **frequency** of the electric power system
 - Maintains **operating reserves**
- The original control areas were **integrated utilities**
 - They own and manage the grid and all generation in their **service territory**
 - They **dispatch** generation to meet load
- Some utilities formed **power pools** (PJM, NEPOOL)
 - They implemented **least cost dispatch** and **reserve sharing**
 - They became a common control area

The Microgrid in Context

- A **microgrid** is
 - A microcosm of the Grid – integrates **generation** and **load**
 - It can **Island** from the grid
 - It can provide **services** to the grid
- To its owner/operator a microgrid is a micro control area
- To the grid it is both a load and a resource
- A microgrid can also integrate thermal load, energy storage and advanced controls – both internal and grid-facing – making it qualitatively different from other resources

State Utility Regulation

- Utilities were viewed as “**natural monopolies**”
 - They received **franchises** for their **service territories**
 - They assumed an **obligation to serve** all customers
- State established **Public Utility Commissions (PUCs)** to assure that utility rates were **just and reasonable**
 - Utilities have a **revenue requirement** needed to meet operating costs and provide a **rate of return** to shareholders
 - They adopt **tariffs** – schedules of charges to classes of customers – that must be approved by the PUC in a **rate case**
 - Charges for energy are assessed by KWh
 - **Standby charges** may be fixed or based on peak demand
 - The tariff rates applied to the demand for all customers must equal the revenue requirement

Misincentives and Cures

- To increase shareholder return utilities:
 - Inflate the **rate base**
 - Sell more KWh
- States and PUCs fight back
 - Certificates of **public convenience and necessity**
 - **Divesting generation**
 - **Retail deregulation**
 - **Decoupling**
 - **Incentive ratemaking**
- PUCs are no longer assuring adequate generation

Federal Power Act (1935)

- Utilities circumvented state regulation through interstate power purchase agreements and wheeling arrangements
- Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) sets rates for
 - Wholesale sales of power (in interstate commerce)
 - Transmission (in interstate commerce)
- Rates must be just and reasonable, and non-discriminatory
- FERC initially set rates by approving individual contracts
- Now gives market based rate authority if no market power
- Extensive regulation of jurisdictional utilities

Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act

- PURPA (1978) was environmental legislation
 - Encouraged renewable energy and efficient cogeneration (**qualified facilities or QFs**)
 - Required utilities to purchase power output of QFs at **avoided cost**
- It spawned a new industry of **independent power producers (IPPs)** largely exempt from federal utility regulation
- Utilities fought back with:
 - **Interconnection agreements**
 - Refusal to wheel power
 - **Auctions** to establish avoided cost
- Congress added **Exempt Wholesale Generators (EWGs)**

Open Access Transmission and RTOs

- To end discrimination against IPPs, FERC required utilities to
 - Adopt an **open access transmission tariff (OATT)**
 - Create an **open access same-time information system (OASIS)**
- FERC orders
 - Encouraged use of **Independent System Operators (ISOs)**
 - Power pools become **regional transmission organizations (RTOs)**
- RTOs are control areas
 - They do **scheduling, transmission planning** and supervise **interconnection**
 - They eliminate **pancaked tariffs**
 - They do a **security constrained dispatch** to schedule transmission through **day-ahead and real-time energy markets** which price **congestion** using **locational marginal prices**
- Most power is not sold in these markets

More RTO Markets

- RTOs realized they needed capacity, reserves and **ancillary services** to manage their control areas
 - They started markets for these services
 - Courts have blessed these markets under the FPA
- They moved to **forward capacity markets**
 - LMP markets don't incentivize new construction
 - They were worried about maintaining **reserve margins** and **reliability must run contracts** were a poor solution
 - Daily capacity markets can be gamed by the **last generator standing** because consumer demand is **inelastic**
 - They adopted administratively determined "**demand curves**"

Demand Response


- The **Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT)** encourages participation of **demand response (DR)** resources in RTO markets to
 - Reduce **peak load**
 - Reduce system costs
- Flat retail energy prices don't incentivize peak load reduction
- DR provides the same **balancing services** as generation and makes RTO markets more competitive
- DR comes from
 - Advanced controls and energy efficiency
 - **Behind-the-meter** generation
- Retail customers (such as microgrids) have been selling into RTO markets through **aggregators**

Danger and Opportunity

- Climate Change
 - Institutional Goals
 - Increased stress on the grid from weather events
 - Increasing environmental regulation
- System Inefficiencies
- Improving distributed generation technologies and falling prices
- Evolving storage resources add elasticity and ancillary services
- DR is an increasing percentage of reserve margins
- IPPs are in the governance of RTOs and are pushing back at DR
- The utility business model is threatened by falling demand
- There is a capital shortfall

Wasting Energy

Estimated U.S. Energy Use in 2009: ~94.6 Quads



Source: LLNL 2010. Data is based on DOE/EIA-0384(2009), August 2010. If this information or a reproduction of it is used, credit must be given to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Department of Energy, under whose auspices the work was performed. Distributed electricity represents only retail electricity sales and does not include self-generation. EIA reports flows for non-thermal resources (i.e., hydro, wind and solar) in BTU-equivalent values by assuming a typical fossil fuel plant "heat rate." The efficiency of electricity production is calculated as the total retail electricity delivered divided by the primary energy input into electricity generation. End use efficiency is estimated as 80% for the residential, commercial and industrial sectors, and as 25% for the transportation sector. Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding. LLNL-MI-410527

The Trends Drive Microgrids

- Microgrids are resilient – backup generation fails frequently
- Microgrids are efficient – with balanced thermal load, over 90%
- Microgrids can improve integration of renewables
 - Provide internal balancing
- Microgrids can incorporate storage – permits **arbitrage**
- Microgrids can manage to the tariff – reduce standby charges
- Microgrids provide services to the grid
 - Demand response
 - **Regulation**
 - Reserves
 - Capacity
- Microgrids support the distribution system

Fuzzy State Incentives

- State run DR programs have had little success
- **Renewable Energy Credits (RECs)**
 - Not tied to carbon outcomes (and badly defined)
 - Unreliable markets
 - Don't reflect demands on the grid
- **Net metering** doesn't reflect grid pricing and can't be shared
- **Social benefit charges** burden ratepayers not taxpayers
- Microgrid incentive programs use poor definitions to qualify
- No recognition of benefits to the distribution system

Regulatory Hurdles for Single Owners

- State definitions of “utility” and “franchise” can
 - Prevent an owner from running wires across a street on its property
 - Prevent a third-party developer from selling power to owner from its own property
 - Only taxable owner can use federal tax benefits
- Interconnection difficulties
 - Complex microgrid functions can complicate study
 - Gives the utility more ways to stall
 - No recognition of system benefits
- Single owner with many meters can’t use **virtual net metering**
- Permitting processes (zoning, air permits) empower **NIMBYs**

Multiparty Microgrids

- Common landlord
 - Some states allow landlord to **submeter** tenants
 - Facilities such as business parks, industrial parks, shopping malls
- Utility owned
 - Improve reliability on a **radial feed**
 - Install storage and islanding capability
 - Not suited to sophisticated controls or thermal integration
- **Utility / private partnerships**
 - Based on contractual arrangements
 - Utility owns wires and owns or allows islanding capability
 - Private developer operates generation, thermal supply, smart controls behind meter at **point of common coupling**

Multiparty Microgrid Hurdles

- Utility and franchise definitions cause even bigger headaches
 - Private developer may be unable to make retail sales of power
 - Can form a local cooperative so that everyone is an owner
 - Can form a local load serving entity if there is retail competition
 - **Community choice aggregation** works in a few states
- Proposals for “**resiliency microgrids**” to serve critical facilities in a community require dedicated wires for emergencies, because islanding is not for contiguous facilities
 - Proposals in Connecticut, New York, New Jersey after Sandy
 - New Jersey considers a “**resiliency tariff**”

RTO Markets

- FERC has been moving to support demand response
 - Order 719 – supports DR in all RTO markets
 - Order 745 – set an LMP price requirement for DR in the energy markets
 - Order 784 – sets rules for services from storage resources
 - RTO capacity markets generally incorporate DR
- Much remains to be done
 - RTO rules can prevent microgrids from performing multiple services
 - The rules aren't designed for microgrids
 - Microgrids have multiple sources of DR with different characteristics
 - PJM rules for **baselines** don't work well for microgrids

EPSA v. FERC

- The DC Circuit Court strikes down Order 745
 - Challenge by IPP group trying to reduce competition from DR
 - Court takes a novel view of the FPA, says states regulate “retail markets” not “retail sales” so FERC can’t set prices
 - States never regulated customer behavior behind the meter
- The Solicitor General has filed a petition for certiorari asking for Supreme Court review
- Utilities asked FERC to remove DR from capacity markets
- PJM has filed to remove DR from the supply side of the market
- The MRC doesn’t believe EPSA requires this even if it survives
 - Suggests a “pass through market” with state regulated aggregators

Utility 2.0

- Several PUCs are undertaking reviews of utility regulation
 - Looking at new utility business models
 - Considering effect of widespread adoption of distributed generation
- New York Public Service Commission **Renewing the Energy Vision (REV)** proceeding
 - Utilities serve as distributed service platforms (DSPs) for integrating widespread distributed energy resources (DERs)
 - DSPs will run markets for services from DERs analogous to RTOs
 - It isn't clear that such markets would be liquid or integrate with RTOs
 - DSPs both run markets and compete in them
 - They have yet to make proposals on ratemaking and compensation for DSPs

More Utility 2.0

- California
 - AB 327 requires a new utility planning framework: “More than Smart”
 - Define optimal locations for DER deployment
 - Identify locational values for DER
 - New tariffs to support DER and removal of barriers
 - Envisions a “node friendly” **network system**
 - Done in the context of California climate change initiatives
 - Also revamping storage interconnection rules, and issued a white paper on microgrids
- Colorado
 - Low prices, no comprehensive reform
 - Frustration leading to municipalization efforts

Utility 2.0 Tensions

- Where does the capital come from?
 - Utilities looking for rate base, but load is shrinking
 - Microgrids and DER bring private capital
 - Social justice issues
- Information issues
 - Who owns customer data? Privacy is being used as a weapon
 - Can utility use customer data to market to the customer?
- Visibility for the system operator
 - Current imprecision of load bids – can microgrids help?
 - Bi-directional dispatch from a set point
 - Seamless network of support without central dispatch?
- Optimizing the grid v. supporting customer choice

A Few Policy Suggestions

- The most important project:
 - Determine what services microgrids provide to the grid
 - Determine what services the grid provides to microgrids
 - Price them both fairly
 - IPPs, utilities and ALEC seek repricing to fight renewables and DER
- Use decoupling and incentive ratemaking to
 - Compensate utilities fairly
 - Give them incentive to promote demand reduction through energy efficiency and distributed generation
- Don't discriminate between owners, developers and unregulated utility affiliates
- Be skeptical of energy efficiency and DER in rate base
- Eliminate barriers to competition and customer choice

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Questions?

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